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Commercial Law
BANKRUPTCY
Melvin G. Dakin*
A bankruptcy case on the docket of the Louisiana Supreme
Court has been a comparative rarity in recent years. However,
during the past term, in the case of Emery & Kaufman, Ltd. v.
Heyl,' the issue was raised before the court as to whether a
discharge in bankruptcy included a claim by a general insurance
agent for unremitted premium balances against a bankrupt local
agent. The claimant argued that the relationship was one of
trust and hence specifically excepted from discharge by the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
2
While the court wavered a bit before doing so, on rehearing,
it rejected the argument, based on a line of cases mainly in
state courts, that the circumstances here created an express or
technical trust.3 If there is to be an exception for this type of
claim from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy it will re-
quire action on the part of the Legislature specifically char-
acterizing the relationship of general insurance agent and local
agent as to premium remissions as one of trust.4 In the mean-
time the general agent remains subject to the same degree of
risk as any other creditor with an ordinary dischargeable con-
tract claim against the local agent. The court noted with ap-
proval that: "The mere reposing of confidence in a person with
whom one has a commercial transaction does not create the
fiduciary relation intended by the Bankruptcy Act."5
CONTROL OF PRICE
Melvin G. Dakin*
In McKinnis v. Scandaliato an alternative federal cause of
action under the Defense Production Act of 19507 permitted
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 227 La. 616, 80 So.2d 95 (1955).
2. 52 STAT. 851 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 17 (1952).
3. 227 La. 616, 633, 80 So.2d 95, 101 (1955).
4. Ibid.
5. Id. at 635, 80 So.2d at 102.
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6. 226 La. 881, 77 So.2d 522 (1955).
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COMMERCIAL LAW
a relatively easy disposition of a case which would otherwise
have required consideration under Civil Code article 2529. The
plaintiff sued for rescission of an automobile sale, or in the
alternative a reduction in price, on the ground that it was held
out to him as new when in fact it was used. As another alterna-
tive he sued for treble the amount of the excess over a ceiling
price regulation as was his right under the price control provi-
sions of the Defense Production Act of 1950.8 The trial court
gave judgment for twice, rather than treble, the amount of the
excess of the selling price over the federal ceiling price, which
under the act it had discretion to do.9 The Supreme Court af-
firmed, finding no error in the trial court's determination that
there had been a willful violation of the federal regulation. 10
Throughout the case, incidentally, it was assumed that the
federal cause of action stemmed from the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942,11 which was repealed effective June 30,
1947.12 Actually during 1952, when this sale took place, the
statutes in effect were the price and wage stabilization provi-
sions of the Defense Production Act of 1950,1 which provided
the same cause of action for overcharges as contained in the
1942 legislation.
CORPORATIONS
Dale E. Bennett*
RELIEF FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
Darmana v. New Orleans Stock Yard' provides a valuable
guide to proper procedures for relief by minority shareholders
who are seeking to prevent the draining off of corporate assets
by way of unjustified executive salaries to the group in control.
The first issue in the case related to the nature of the remedy.
It was held that an injunction to prevent the further diversion
and misappropriation of corporate funds would be a more ap-
propriate remedy than a receivership. The Supreme Court had
previously recognized the advantage of injunctive relief over the
8. Ibid.
9. 226 La. 881, 886, 77 So.2d 522, 523 (1955).
10. 64 STAT. 811 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §2109(c) (1952).
11. 56 STAT. 34 (1942), 50 U.S.C. § 925(e) (Supp. 1944).
12. 60 STAT. 664 (1947), 50 U.S.C. App. § 966 (Supp. 1951).
13. 64 STAT. 811 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 2109(c) (1952).
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